In arXiv: quant-ph/0604122v1 (17 April 2006), Stephen Adler published a critique of our paper "The Free Will Theorem" (arXiv: quant-ph/0604079, of which a slightly updated version [1] appears in "Foundations of Physics"). More recently we have discussed our argument with Professor Adler, and are happy to say that he now agrees with us, after certain clarifications, (see Adler [2] ). Adler's main concern is that spin measurements are not instantaneous, and also that the time they take varies with direction. The information available to the particle will vary with this time. This is true, but causes no problem. Particle a's response function θ a may depend on all the information that arrives up to the time of its response. We can in fact allow its domain to include information up to a time T that maximizes this response time over the 40 triples used in our argument. Of course θ a for a particular triple will not in fact vary with information that arrives later than the response time for that triple, but that does not affect its functional nature (a function does not have to vary with all its arguments). A similar argument applies to θ b .
(In fact our argument took this into account, though only implicitly, because the information α ′ of which θ a is a function was defined to be independent of x, y, z. However, we are glad to provide the extra clarification.)
In view of this, we do not actually need the "sequence of experiments" that Adler goes on to discuss. Each of the two experimenters of our argument makes just one experiment; for B this is to measure the squared spin in a direction w, while A makes three such measurements in orthogonal directions x, y, z. The reason why no sequence of such experiments is needed is that our "functional hypothesis" threatens to produce what we called a "101-function" of direction. Since no such function exists there must be a failure of one of our axioms SPIN, TWIN or FIN. A failure of SPIN would be revealed if A were to measure just the failing triple x, y, z, while a failure of TWIN at w would be revealed if B were to measure w and A any triple including w. (As we said in the paper, FIN is justified not by direct experiment but as a consequence of relativity.)
We are grateful to Adler for pointing us to the three papers [3] , [4] , [5] . These also twin the K-S paradox to obtain "no-go theorems" that go beyond those in the book by Redhead referenced in our paper. However, the Free Will Theorem is even stronger, in the ways mentioned there.
We add some remarks on another topic. Several physicists have proposed a type of model in which superluminal transmission is possible in one sense (say, "on the inner level"), but not in another ("on the outer level"). For instance, the hits of potential GRW explanations will be on the inner level, but experimenters cannot send messages superluminally, since they can only access the outer level. Indeed, the Janus models of our paper are of this type, since Janus acts superluminally, but they are not covariant, because the image of one Janus model under a Lorentz transformation is another Janus model. A general strategy -we might call it the multi-Janus approach -for achieving covariance is to combine all these images in some way. One way of doing this was advocated in Fleming [6] ; a similar one, based on a paper of Aharanov and Albert [7] , was suggested for the GRW model by Ghiradi [8] .
These may indeed be covariant in a formal sense, but the Free Will Theorem shows that any such strategy, if it works, must have the "dirty needles" peculiarity described in the final version [1] of our paper, which discusses theories that operate by injecting new information into an otherwise deterministic universe. We show there that even if this new information is intrinsically stochastic and/or non-locally correlated, this will not help to account for our spin experiments, unless the injection "uses dirty needles". By this we mean that either the information injected near particle b provides knowledge about experimenter A's choice of x, y, z, or that injected near a involves knowledge of w.
Each of these clearly contradicts the Free Will Assumption, since in a suitable inertial frame b's response happens before A chooses x, y, z, while in another frame a's response happens before B chooses w. Alternatively, we can view this as a violation of causality that is gross in two ways -because it concerns the location of spots on macroscopic screens, and because the response of a particle can depend on decisions that may only be made 5 minutes after that response. However, these violations have a curious kind of deniability, in that they are undetectable by observers who do not have access to all the information involved.
To summarize; explanations of this two-level type face a dilemma -injections by "clean needles" cannot account for our spin experiments, while the use of dirty needles is a gross violation of both causality and the Free Will Assumption.
